
Vivek Kaul is a writer and an economic commentator.
November 18, 2026 at 3:29 AM IST
The Reserve Bank of India’s monetary policy committee is scheduled to meet in early December to decide on the future direction of interest rates in India.
A small-scale industry has emerged to advise the RBI on what to do. It includes economists, analysts, those in the business of managing other people’s money (the OPM wallahs, that is), government bureaucrats, business lobbies and commentators like me.
The advice is coming thick and fast, but the inflation figures tell their own story. Retail inflation in October 2026 stood at 6.1%. Wholesale inflation was 12.3%. The RBI’s upper tolerance limit for retail inflation is 6%.
Clearly, inflation is already on the higher side and the RBI has barely moved on the interest rate front. It raised the repo rate – the rate at which it lends to banks for short-term funds – by 25 basis points to 5.5% in October 2026. This was the first time the monetary policy committee had raised rates since February 2023.
One school of thought within the small-scale industry is that higher prices have primarily been driven by supply shocks due to the war in West Asia and the “very-strong” El Nino weather pattern.
In October 2026, food inflation stood at close to 9%. Food products weigh a little under 35% in the consumer price index, which measures retail inflation. Retail inflation is up primarily because of supply shocks, and there is nothing that the RBI can do about it. Or so we are being told by many in this emerging small-scale industry.
The trouble is that this isn’t the first time something like this has been said by those who make a living following, thinking about, talking about and writing about the RBI’s monetary policy. Or, to put it simply, those who are in the business of creating a mahaul around monetary policy.
Most such economists are on the rolls of corporates, work at think tanks funded by corporates, work with OPM wallahs or are employed by business lobbies. Now, no corporate likes higher interest rates, which is why the economists employed by them tend to make the points that they do. The stock market also does not like higher interest rates, given that higher rates drive away retail money from stocks into fixed-income instruments.
So, can the RBI bring down food inflation? Of course not. But that doesn’t mean it shouldn’t raise the repo rate.
Indeed, as Raghuram Rajan, the then governor of the RBI, said in a June 2016 speech: “Some argue, rightly, that it is hard for RBI to directly control food demand through monetary policy. Then they proceed, incorrectly, to say we should not bother about controlling CPI inflation.”
And that’s wrong. As Rajan said: “We can control demand for other, more discretionary items in the consumption basket through tighter monetary policy. To prevent sustained food inflation from becoming generalised inflation through higher wage increases, we have to reduce inflation in other items.”
Given this, the RBI should be looking at raising the repo rate in its December monetary policy. There are other reasons as well.
Bond Spreads
In fact, from January 2016 to November 17, 2026, there are 2,627 data points in the above chart. The spread on November 17, 2026, at the time of writing this, was 213 basis points. When spreads since January 2016 are ranked, the November 17 reading ranks 2,500th among 2,627 data points.
Second, it can be argued that FIIs are back to investing in Indian stocks and, hence, we can ignore their lack of interest in government bonds. In November 2026, FIIs have net invested ₹898.56 billion or $9.5 billion in Indian stocks.
Higher inflation can lead to the rupee depreciating against the dollar. The performance of the FIIs is measured in dollar terms, and a sustained depreciation of the rupee eats into their returns. This is another good reason to raise the repo rate so that FIIs are incentivised to continue bringing dollars into the country.
Inflation Risks
As anyone who understands how banking works and how banks create new money every time they give out a loan will tell you, loans create deposits, not the other way round.
Deposits are a part of the money supply. Yearly money supply growth as of October 31, 2026, stood at 16.4%. It was 9% as of October 31, 2025. This high growth will chase the same amount of goods and services and push up inflation further.
Of course, the causality is not always as straightforward as the above paragraph makes it sound. Nonetheless, loan growth of more than 19% and money supply growth of more than 16% cannot really be ignored by a central bank looking to control inflation.
Fourth, if high inflation persists, people will begin factoring it into their expectations and decisions, including demanding higher wages. This, in turn, will make inflation even harder to control. Or, as the minutes of RBI’s latest MPC meeting put it: “As regards supply side inflation, monetary policy primarily acts by curtailing second round effects.”
Fifth, the negative effects of El Niño will play out through much of 2027 as well, while the troubles in West Asia – despite the recent fall in oil prices – don't seem to be going away anytime soon, keeping the risks to crude oil prices and inflation alive.
Finally, it’s important that the RBI does not repeat the mistakes it made during and after the pandemic, when it kept insisting that inflation was transitory.
Inflation can become entrenched if central banks are slow to respond. The current situation is not identical to the pandemic, but the lessons remain relevant. Supply-side shocks may explain why prices are rising, but they don't eliminate the need to control inflation.
The RBI cannot do much about El Niño or the troubles in West Asia. But it can act to prevent the resulting inflation from spreading across the economy. And that is precisely why it needs to raise the repo rate by at least 50 basis points in December.