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India’s strategic autonomy is under growing strain as Washington’s renewed engagement with Pakistan, pressure over Russian oil and the deepening US-China rivalry complicate its choices.


Rajesh Ramachandran is a former Editor-in-Chief of The Tribune group of newspapers and Outlook magazine.
October 2, 2026 at 8:39 AM IST
As the world marvels at the extraordinary actions of the passenger who entered the cockpit of the flydubai aircraft while it was diving nose-down and helped stabilise the controls, India gets a new hero, Israel tries to win back its friendship, and US President Donald Trump, in an exercise of reckless opportunism, names Iran as the villain of a hijack plot. But this was only the climax of a weeklong drama that began at the United Nations General Assembly.
Trump continued to berate India by posting portions of Pakistan Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s speech at the UNGA, prompting External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar to defend India’s position on cross-border terrorism and its military response to transgressions. Since Operation Sindoor, the US has managed to re-hyphenate India and Pakistan and has cleverly trapped India in the quicksands of diplomatic chicanery. India now finds itself defending its position at every international forum, after managing to ignore Pakistan altogether for more than a decade.
Even Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the US was framed as India’s loss, as if India holds the levers of power over the world’s most powerful nations. In fact, this is a moment of reckoning and a much-needed reality check in India’s understanding of where it stands in the big-power competition. Finally, shrugging off the self-adorned Vishwa Guru mantle, India has acknowledged China’s position as a competitor to the US. Jaishankar was unequivocal about China’s rise when he spoke at the Asia Society Policy Institute earlier this week.
Jaishankar acknowledged that the US and China are in a “competitive mode” and that other countries are trying to de-risk and diversify to protect their national interests. This is a significant statement from India’s foreign minister, acknowledging that India refuses to get drawn into the strategic competition and would not act as a proxy for the US on the icy peaks of the Himalayas. But it is also an admission that India has lost leverage with the US, which is constantly using Pakistan to put pressure on India ––– a game it has mastered over several decades and many wars.
As if on cue, the European Union ambassador to India gave newspaper interviews, graciously allowing India to buy Russian crude for its own use but telling India that it is “not possible” to export refined petroleum products to Europe. The colonial tenor of the conversation is simply lost on the new bloc of old colonisers that still wants to decide how India manages its energy security and trade. This is despite the much-awaited free trade agreement, which is due to be signed in December in Brussels.
The EU ambassador’s statement closely followed US Senator Richard Blumenthal’s bipartisan Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, which provides for tariffs of up to 100% and was signed into law by Trump, making it clear that the EU has decided to put further pressure on India. This comes after India turned to the US for gas and Venezuela for oil. The US is now India’s largest source of liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas, while, at the US’s urging, India has become the largest importer of Venezuelan oil. All this does not seem to be enough.
The phone call between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Trump on Wednesday does not seem to have made a difference. The conversation is supposed to have touched upon the Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, trade, defence and critical technology. India’s concerns do not appear to have made a difference to the Trump administration’s pressure tactics.
The West is undoubtedly cornering India and wants to test the limits of India’s pliability. This is in sharp contrast to the period of India-US bonhomie, when the latter hoped to see the former as a bulwark against the rise of China. India’s refusal to engage in conflict with China has contributed to the current crisis, if one may call it that. India is now left with few choices and some tough realities:
It is in this context that India needs to contend with the implications of the bilateral meetings between the presidents of China and the US. Xi and Trump met in Beijing in May and again in September in Washington. However, soon after Xi’s visit, US Ambassador to China David Perdue described the relationship as ‘a very bumpy road’ and said America’s dependence on China for rare earths, magnets, and pharmaceuticals was ‘unacceptable’. He also cautioned China against providing intelligence and hardware to Iran.
Room Beyond the Rivalry
In times of unbearable geopolitical pressure, a Russia-India-China huddle could be a potent response to retain sovereignty and exercise strategic autonomy. BRICS showed what India is capable of. The drama inside a cockpit need not deter India from maintaining close ties with Iran during what India sees as a blatant neo-colonial invasion aimed at the country’s vast gas and oil reserves. Normalisation of ties with China is an absolute necessity in these times of terrible uncertainty. A re-hyphenation in the subcontinent calls for a reimagining of India’s possibilities, seeking peace and prosperity.