Do we expect our leaders to predict the future, prevent catastrophes, and yet never inconvenience us in the process? From what happened this November, it feels so.
The Federal Aviation Administration in the United States ordered a nationwide ground stop in November after its telecommunications network became unstable during equipment upgrades. Flights were grounded, with more than 12,000 cancellations reported in a day and disruptions continuing afterwards.
This wasn't the first warning that aviation communications could be vulnerable. On November 19, 2009, a telecommunications failure had disrupted hundreds of flights. A June 2010 report by the US Department of Transportation's Inspector General identified contractor configuration errors, criticised shortcomings in oversight, and warned that vulnerabilities remained as new services were added to the network. So, this makes the questions about testing, oversight and organisational memory difficult to dismiss.
Interestingly, two days prior to this, across the Atlantic, Portugal closed schools and non-essential public services as Storm Charles approached. Weather authorities had warned of dangerous winds and heavy rainfall. Families scrambled to make arrangements, businesses faced disruptions, the country prepared for potentially severe consequences, and several supermarkets ran out of toilet paper and bottled water.
The storm's impact was less destructive than many had feared. Social media joked that Charles, just like all men, promised everything and delivered nothing. The opposition criticised the government for overreacting at a substantial financial cost to the nation.
In Portugal, the question was why authorities had taken such extensive precautions. In America, it was whether vulnerabilities should have received more attention before the disruption.
We want leaders who are never alarmist, never negligent, never wrong and never surprised. So, basically, we want punditji with accurate horoscope readings, preferably with a crystal ball, an economics degree and a money-back guarantee. And yet somehow, we don't find this expectation absurd.
Because when precautions are taken and catastrophe does not follow, the measures feel unnecessary. But, when precautions are neglected and catastrophe strikes, the failure to act appears unforgivable. So, what is a leader supposed to do?
This dilemma is as old as civilisation. Remember Cassandra, the Trojan princess? She was blessed and cursed. Apollo had granted her the ability to foresee the future and then cursed her that nobody would believe her. So when she warned the Trojans of impending disaster, nobody listened to her.
Modern organisations have their own Cassandras of brilliant forecasting record, and yet absolutely dreadful stakeholder engagement.
And can we blame them? How can a leader decide what deserves attention while the information is still incomplete and there are too many variables looming in the air? A decision-maker may not even know all the possible outcomes, let alone their probabilities. The leaders are expected to decide today, when the evidence that would make the decision easy will arrive tomorrow.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb offers the best illustration for this. He asks us to imagine if a legislator who, on September 10, 2001, just a day before the 9/11 attack, successfully introduced a law requiring continuously locked, reinforced cockpit doors in commercial aircraft.
The airlines would have complained about the expense. The crews would have complained about the inconvenience. Someone would have questioned the need for an expensive security measure against a threat that had never materialised. Even if the measure would have prevented the attacks of September 11, the legislator would have remained an obscure, unpopular politician rather than becoming a national hero. Because the sad truth is that prevention rarely makes heroes.
We have psychological research demonstrating that people evaluate the quality of decisions partly through their outcomes, even when those outcomes were not known at the time the decision was made.
We all do this, constantly. A doctor recommends an expensive precautionary test. It comes back normal. Suddenly, we wonder whether the test was necessary.
Our car makes an unusual noise. We ignore it for three months because nothing has happened. When the engine finally gives up on the highway, we announce that somebody should have warned us.
This is preparedness paradox. Successful precautions can avert the crisis, and therefore make the original threat appear exaggerated. The cost of prevention is there in the books for everyone to see, but the losses that might have occurred without it become harder to show. And so, the leader who authorised the expenditure receives a bill instead of applause.
This leads to defensive decision making. This is why sensible people make suboptimal decisions.
In a study researchers examined defensive decision-making among public-administration managers.
As many as 80% admitted to defensive decision making even when they believed that one option was better for the organisation, yet chose another to protect themselves from possible blame. To describe this phenomena, the researchers used a wonderfully unacademic-sounding term CYA: Cover Your Ass.
This happens in cultures with low psychological safety and low authentic leadership. When managers expected blame and lacked reassurance from their leaders, personally safer decisions became more attractive. Its implications are ugly though.
For example, a leader might postpone precautionary measures to avoid looking alarmist. Another might impose unnecessarily sweeping restrictions to ensure that nobody can later accuse them of having done too little.
These seem like opposite behaviour, but they share the same root of blame avoidance and if we want to build high-reliability organisations we must build strength to resist this tendency.
One way to do so is, when warning lights flicker and nothing happens, instead of saying, “Great our system is safe”, we need to treat that anomaly as a symptom of something breaking down. Instead of waiting for the whole system to crash to prove danger was real, leaders can actively hunt for small glitches and encourage frontline workers to fearlessly share every weird data point. After all, every outlier has a story behind it, and that story must be unearthed.
But constant vigilance has its own costs. If we treat every unusual reading as an emergency and the emergency department itself will need an emergency department.
My grandfather used to tell me a story from the Panchatantra, about three fish living in a pond. One day, some fishermen passed by and noticed how many fish were swimming in the water. "Let's return tomorrow with our nets," they decided. The fish overheard the conversation.
The first immediately took the warning seriously. She swam through a connecting stream to another pond. The second decided to stay. If danger arrived, she would think of something. The third considered the entire discussion unnecessarily dramatic. After all, the fishermen hadn't actually returned. There was no certainty that they would. Why abandon a comfortable home because of a conversation between strangers?
The next morning, the fishermen arrived with their nets. The first fish was already safe. The second was caught but escaped by using her presence of mind, pretending to be dead until she was discarded. The third, who had done nothing, perished.
Vishnu Sharma, the author of Panchtantra, had no MBA, no "business agility” or “agile mindset” listed on his LinkedIn, yet he offered a rather sophisticated lesson in decision-making under Knightian uncertainty (which, by the way, is supported by modern psychological studies).
The first fish was prepared to bear a certain cost, leaving her familiar pond, to avoid a serious possible danger. Today, we call this proactive exit.
The second depended on improvisation. It worked, but only after she was caught in the net. This is what we label as agility. The ability to improvise and adjust your response hour by hour as the new facts emerge. Instead of making one rigid, all-or-nothing decision, leaders deploy modular, reversible steps.
The third treated uncertainty about the fishermen's intentions as a reason to discount the warning altogether. That’s clinging to the status quo.
It is tempting to celebrate the clever second fish. We admire quick thinkers. In a Bollywood movie, she would probably get the best dialogue and a heroic background score. But I suspect the first fish would have had a rather more peaceful morning.
Preparedness, resilience and agility are not identical. Preparedness means taking action before a threat materialises. Resilience means having systems capable of absorbing disruption. Agility means adjusting a response as new information arrives. A leader needs judgment about which of these is appropriate, and when.
So, it’s not a simple ‘to act or not to act’ dilemma, but how much to act, how early, at what cost, and with what possibility of changing course. That is a more demanding task than telling everyone to be agile.
Moreover, this can only happen when leaders acknowledge the uncertainty. However, research shows that leaders who actually do that and say “I am uncertain” are perceived as weak, and no leader wants that perception. But as anyone who has ever been in a relationship will tell you, it's not what you say but how you say matters. The same uncertainty can be explicitly framed as property of the situation.
In the same research, participants generally rated leaders as more competent when they described uncertainty as a property of the situation, "It is uncertain" “or data and models are uncertain”, rather than of themselves, "I am uncertain”, were perceived as more trustworthy and competent.
So perhaps our leaders don’t need a crystal ball after all. They just need to acknowledge uncertainty without making it sound like incompetence. After all, anyone who has ever been married knows how expensive the wrong choice of words can be.