The immediate question after Trump’s electoral setback is whether a renewed US attack on Iran has become more or less likely. The answer depends on decisions that may come before the new Congress takes office.

Will the Verdict Restrain an Attack?
The most urgent issue after US midterm elections is whether the result reduces the danger of a renewed major US attack on Iran. Governments, shipping companies and households have immediate reasons to care. Another round of large-scale strikes could bring Iranian retaliation, further disruption of Gulf shipping and higher energy prices; just when the Indian stock market has started to boom. Yet, it is to be remembered that the election has changed the political pressures on Donald Trump. But has not removed his ability to order military action.

No doubt, there are reasons for restraint. Voters have punished Republicans for the war’s economic costs, and further disruption could deepen that anger. Yet Trump could conclude that a limited but forceful attack would improve his negotiating position and demonstrate that electoral defeat has not weakened US resolve. The result strengthens the case for avoiding a prolonged war; it cannot assure us against a new round of strikes that will create as much uncertainty.

The Republican defeat reflects public dissatisfaction with living costs, economic policy and the war with Iran. The connection is understandable. Disruption of Gulf energy supplies raises fuel prices and adds to household expenses. Public anger over the war and its economic costs contributed to the Republican defeat.

Trump’s acceptance of the result is a good sign for the constitutional process. His willingness to work with Democrats also leaves room for agreement. Neither response tells us whether he will show greater restraint towards Iran. Accepting an electoral defeat and changing a military decision are separate matters.

What Congress Can Actually Do?
The US Constitution gives the Democrats ways to challenge Trump, while leaving him in charge of the executive. Congress passes laws and approves spending. Its committees can summon officials, examine records and question government decisions. The Senate can reject presidential nominees. Trump can veto legislation, although two-thirds majorities in both chambers can override him; that is of course non-existent. Winning Congress gives Democrats substantial power, but no blanket authority to govern.

My reading of these arrangements suggests that funding and scrutiny could matter particularly for the war. Democrats can ask what the US is trying to achieve, how much it will cost and when its forces will leave the war zone. They could seek to restrict money for further operations. But they would then have to explain how those restrictions would affect US troops and security interests. They will share responsibility for the consequences of their decisions.

We need not expect every disagreement to end in a presidential veto. Trump has threatened to use it, but both parties will have reasons to negotiate over legislation that must pass. Bargaining over spending, appointments and investigations may influence his decisions before a bill reaches his desk. Public confrontation could continue even as agreements are reached privately. It promises to be chaotic as we go into the next half of Trump’s presidency.  

The immediate danger lies in the interval before January, when the new Congress takes office. Until then, Republicans retain control. The incoming Democratic majority cannot be treated as an immediate brake on an attack. Trump could order operations that leave it dealing with the consequences. Iranian retaliation or an incident involving US forces could also drive decisions faster than Congress can respond.

The Next Election Still Matters
Trump does not face another presidential election, but his party does. Republican legislators must defend their seats, while potential presidential contenders such as JD Vance and Marco Rubio must consider their prospects for 2028. Their willingness to support unpopular policies may weaken if they believe those policies will cost them future elections.

Trump also has reasons to care. He will want to influence the choice of his successor and how history judges his presidency. A settlement abroad could strengthen his legacy. So could a military outcome he regards as decisive. The election result alone cannot tell us which course he will favour.

The Democratic victory will give more of its politicians a national audience. Leading committees, questioning officials and proposing legislation can help new figures build support. Yet larger numbers do not remove disagreements within the party. Democrats must still decide what they want the US to do in West Asia, beyond criticising Trump’s record.

A Deal He Can Present as Success
Trump is unlikely to sign an agreement that makes him appear to have yielded under electoral pressure. Iran would be largely incorrect if it assumed that Republican losses make US concessions inevitable. He could respond to such expectations by maintaining his demands or increasing military pressure.

Nevertheless, a deal remains possible if he believes its terms justify the war and protect US interests. Lower energy prices and reduced military commitments would bring benefits at home. He would need to explain the agreement as the result of his policy. Negotiators should recognise that requirement without assuming that presentation alone can overcome substantive differences.

Netanyahu’s loss of his governing majority adds another uncertainty to Trump’s calculations. He remains caretaker Prime Minister while efforts to form a new government continue. A successor government could be less enthusiastic about further attacks on Iran and more willing to explore a settlement. Trump would then have to reconsider the scale and purpose of American military action alongside an Israeli leadership with different priorities.

Iran must decide whether to pursue terms both sides could accept or hold out for more. Waiting might improve its bargaining position, but could also bring renewed attacks. Washington faces a similar problem: further pressure might secure concessions or persuade Tehran that no acceptable agreement is available. Each side’s attempt to improve a deal could instead prolong the war.

One Agreement Cannot End Every War
Israel faces uncertainty over its own government after an inconclusive election. Whoever leads it will need to judge how much support Washington will provide for further operations. A Democratic Congress could question weapons transfers, expenditure and military objectives more closely. Israel will need to maintain relationships across US party lines as well as with the President.

The Gulf states have strong reasons to encourage negotiations. Their investment plans, infrastructure and export earnings depend on secure shipping and confidence in regional stability. They can help mediate, but the parties themselves must agree on sanctions, maritime access and measures to prevent renewed attacks. Another short pause in fighting would offer limited reassurance to businesses and shipping companies.

An US agreement with Iran would not automatically end the fighting in Lebanon, Yemen or Gaza. Different organisations and governments make decisions on those fronts. Negotiators would have to establish which parties can commit to stopping attacks and whether they can enforce those commitments. Otherwise, fighting elsewhere could quickly undermine a US–Iran agreement.

Preparing for an Unsettled World
The wider lesson is that the world may face a long period in which relationships keep changing without a stable order emerging. Countries are reassessing whom they can rely on and where they need alternatives. They may negotiate with an adversary while preparing for another confrontation. Agreements may address immediate dangers while leaving the main dispute unresolved.

This would mean more years of sanctions, threats, limited attacks and negotiations occurring together. India must protect its energy supplies, shipping and citizens through continued engagement across West Asia.

For now, the test is immediate: can Washington and Tehran avoid another major exchange of attacks? The election gives Trump stronger reasons to seek an end to the conflict. It gives the region no guarantee that he will avoid further force to achieve it.