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Gurumurthy, ex-central banker and a Wharton alum, managed the rupee and forex reserves, government debt and played a key role in drafting India's Financial Stability Reports.
March 25, 2026 at 3:00 PM IST
Indian investors have long treated gold as the ultimate anchor — an asset immune to financial engineering, policy errors, and market theatrics. It is, in many ways, the anti-finance asset. Which makes the rise of gold and silver ETFs both inevitable and faintly ironic by wrapping the most ancient store of value in the most modern financial structure.
The promise was simple. Buy an ETF, and you own gold, without the inconvenience of storage, purity concerns, or making charges. Liquidity and price efficiency would do the rest. Except, in India, they often don’t.
At the heart of the issue lies a deceptively simple metric: the gap between an ETF’s Net Asset Value and its market price — NAV to Market Price Delta. In a well-functioning ETF, the two should move almost in lockstep. Globally, they largely do. Deviations are typically small and short-lived, arbitraged away in basis points. In India, however, the gap tends to linger and at times widen and often leads to crashes in ETF prices. Gold/ETFs in recent past traded at premiums which were not insignificant. These are not rounding errors. They are signals of something structural.
To understand why, one must step back from gold and examine what keeps markets honest. Efficient markets are not those that suppress speculation, but those that discipline it. Four forces typically anchor prices to value. Relative value trading ensures that assets are priced in context, not isolation. Arbitrage enforces alignment by exploiting mispricing. Leverage makes such trades viable at scale. And informed speculation suppresses irrational excess by acting early and decisively. Where these forces are active, mispricing is brief and self-correcting.
This is why global ETFs function with such precision. Institutional participants continuously arbitrage across ETFs, futures, and physical gold. Execution is frictionless, leverage is accessible, and capital is plentiful. The result is not just efficiency. It is ‘enforcement’. Prices are not allowed to drift far from NAV because too many participants are incentivised to prevent it.
The Indian market, by contrast, is defined less by the presence of these forces and more by their absence. Relative value trading remains limited. Arbitrage, though theoretically possible, is often uneconomical due to transaction costs, operational frictions, and large lot sizes. Leverage is neither as accessible nor as scalable. Most importantly, the ecosystem lacks sufficient “good speculation.” Institutional participation is thinner, and price discovery is disproportionately driven by retail flows.
In such a setting, mispricing is not aggressively corrected. Rather it is tolerated. Prices begin to reflect demand more than value. When inflows surge, ETFs drift to premiums. When sentiment weakens, they slip into discounts. Without active arbitrage capital to counter these moves, the gaps persist.
For investors, this divergence introduces an often-overlooked cost. Buying at a premium embeds an immediate drag, one that must compress before any gains from gold can accrue. Exiting in weak markets can be equally punishing if ETFs trade at discounts. What is marketed as a passive instrument thus becomes quietly tactical. Entry price, liquidity, and timing begin to matter far more than expected. The simplicity of “buying gold” gives way to navigating market structure.
If gold ETFs reveal the issue, silver ETFs amplify it. With higher volatility and lower liquidity, pricing dislocations are sharper and more persistent. The paradox is hard to miss. The more volatile the underlying asset, the less reliable the ETF wrapper becomes.
In developed markets, ETFs are celebrated for improving price discovery. In India’s precious metals segment, they can introduce a second layer of inefficiency. The investor is no longer just taking a view on gold or silver, but on the functioning of the ETF ecosystem itself viz., its liquidity, arbitrage depth, and participant mix. This is not a flaw in the product but a reflection of the market it inhabits.
Gold ETFs remain useful instruments. They offer convenience and accessibility that physical holdings cannot match. But they are not frictionless mirrors of the underlying asset. A more honest description would be simple - ‘an Indian gold ETF is gold, with a margin of error’. And that margin is shaped not by gold, but by the structure around it.
Until the underlying disciplines relative value trading, arbitrage, leverage, and informed speculation deepen, this gap will persist. And investors would do well to remember that when you buy gold through an ETF in India, you are not just buying gold. You are buying into a market still learning how to price it.