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Ajay Srivastava, founder of Global Trade Research Initiative, is an ex-Indian Trade Service officer with expertise in WTO and FTA negotiations.
July 29, 2026 at 3:01 PM IST
The US Senate has moved closer to giving President Donald Trump a new trade tool to pressure countries buying Russian crude oil, including India. The bipartisan Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026 would authorise the President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on imports from major buyers of Russian energy.
Senators voted 86-12 on July 28 to invoke cloture—a procedure requiring 60 votes to end debate and advance a bill to a final vote—demonstrating strong bipartisan support. Because final passage requires only a simple majority in the 100-member Senate, the bill is widely expected to clear the chamber. It would then require approval by the House of Representatives and the President's signature before becoming law.
Even if enacted, the tariffs would not take effect automatically. Section 113 gives the President discretionary authority to impose tariffs of up to 100% on imports from countries purchasing Russian oil and natural gas, allowing the administration to decide whether to act, which countries to target and what tariff rate to apply.
Before any tariffs can be imposed, the US Trade Representative must identify and review the five largest buyers of Russian energy every 180 days. Based on current trade patterns, those countries are likely to include China, India, Slovakia, Hungary and Azerbaijan. The President would then decide whether to impose tariffs, determine the tariff rate and grant exemptions where allowed.
Countries importing less than 15% of their total energy from Russia and demonstrably reducing their dependence could qualify for an exemption. The tariff authority would remain in force for five years unless renewed by Congress.
The bill also expands US sanctions on Russia beyond trade. It mandates secondary sanctions on shipping companies, insurers and vessels in Russia's "shadow fleet," broadens sanctions on major Russian banks, oligarchs and senior political figures, and extends the Iran Sanctions Act through 2031.
Although China is the world's largest buyer of Russian crude oil, India could face greater pressure under the proposed legislation. The Trump administration has previously targeted India while sparing China. In July 2025, it imposed a 25% tariff on India while excluding China, before withdrawing the measure in February 2026.
Because the bill gives the President broad discretion over whether to impose tariffs and which countries to target, India could again become a more likely target despite importing far less Russian oil than China.
The stakes for India are substantial. Russia supplied 30.3% of India's crude oil imports in 2025-26, worth $40.8 billion out of total crude imports of $134.7 billion, making it India's largest oil supplier. Access to discounted Russian crude has significantly lowered India's import bill, supported energy security, and helped contain inflation.
Washington is steadily expanding its use of trade and economic measures to pursue strategic objectives. Reciprocal tariffs, Section 301 investigations, forced-labour measures, sector-specific duties, and now Russia-related sanctions reflect an increasingly broad toolkit of economic pressure.
India should avoid recalibrating its policies in response to every new US action. Decisions on crude oil imports must be driven by India's economic interests, energy security, and strategic autonomy—not by the threat of additional US tariffs. As long as Russian crude remains commercially viable, New Delhi should continue sourcing it while managing differences with Washington through dialogue and negotiation, rather than making unilateral concessions under pressure.