Why the ‘Islamic Nato’ Will Remain a Strategic Mirage

Recent media reports suggesting that Turkey is exploring a mutual defence arrangement with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia—sometimes described as an “Islamic NATO” with an Article-5-type guarantee—have generated predictable alarm and speculation. These reports acquire added significance in the wake of the Saudi–Pakistan strategic security agreement signed in September 2025, which marked a formal deepening of defence cooperation between Riyadh and Islamabad. Together, these developments appear, on the surface, to suggest a significant reconfiguration of security thinking in the Islamic world, raising questions about the emergence of a collective defence framework.

A closer examination, however, reveals that this is not alliance formation, but strategic signalling. What we are witnessing is a convergence of ambition, anxiety, and opportunism, not the emergence of a coherent collective defence system. The drivers are real; the outcomes are likely to be limited.

Why Now
The current discourse is unfolding against a backdrop of eroding certainty in Western security guarantees, but this must be qualified carefully. Pakistan does not suffer from complete Western neglect. On the contrary, under Donald Trump’s renewed presidency, Washington has shown high tactical interest in Pakistan, particularly in relation to Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and regional balancing. Yet Islamabad understands the maverick nature of Trump’s decision-making and the transactional character of US engagement. This makes Pakistan wary of over-reliance on American commitments.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, is reassessing its strategic environment. US reliability is no longer taken for granted, and the Kingdom’s internal transformation under Vision 2030 is under strain. The NEOM project’s uncertain trajectory, combined with long-term energy market volatility and the looming challenge of transitioning from hydrocarbons to trade and technology, has affected Saudi strategic confidence. These pressures naturally translate into a search for psychological deterrence and external reassurance.

Turkey’s motivations are different again. Still a NATO member but denied entry into the European Union, Ankara remains strategically embedded in the West while politically estranged from it. This duality has pushed Turkey to seek parallel influence in West Asia and the Islamic world, not as a replacement for NATO, but as an additional vector of leverage.

Why Article-5 Logic Breaks Down
The central flaw in the “Islamic NATO” idea lies in the asymmetry of perceived threats and strategic objectives. Saudi Arabia views Iran as an existential adversary, particularly in light of Tehran’s nuclear traject  ory and its regional proxy network. This is notwithstanding the ambitious Chinese effort to draw the two into an agreement, some years ago.  Turkey, however, sees Iran primarily as a competitive peer—a rival for influence in Iraq, Syria, the Caucasus, and the wider Islamic narrative, not an existential enemy. Pakistan’s perspective is more cautious still: Iran is a neighbour that must be managed, not confronted.

This divergence makes NATO-style mutual defence guarantees fundamentally problematic. NATO emerged from a shared and unambiguous perception of threat during the Cold War. No such unity exists here. Indeed, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are themselves competitors for leadership of the Sunni Islamic world, while Pakistan harbours its own long-term ambitions of Islamic leadership, albeit constrained by economics and geography.

We can witness that convergence on the NATO model—where political unity precedes military integration—simply does not exist in this triangle.

Turkey’s Constraints
The most decisive argument against the effectiveness—or even the signing—of a binding mutual defence agreement lies in Turkey’s NATO membership.

It is inconceivable that Ankara would accept binding military obligations to Riyadh or Islamabad, allow those commitments to clash with NATO interests, or permit Turkish forces to be drawn into Gulf or South Asian contingencies not sanctioned by NATO’s strategic framework. While Turkey frequently projects itself as a leader of the Islamic world, it is inescapably bound to NATO’s security framework. Positioned at the crossroads of Europe, the Black Sea, and the Middle East, Turkey faces a persistent Russian threat and continuing instability in Eastern Europe. Under these conditions, Ankara cannot afford to antagonise NATO or compromise alliance cohesion. Any binding military commitments outside NATO would undercut Turkey’s core security interests, rendering notions of an Islamic collective-defence pact largely impractical. Any arrangement with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia would therefore remain political, consultative, and symbolic, not operationally binding. This reality alone renders Article-5-style assurances implausible.

Turkey’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, therefore, must be understood as tactical convergence, not reconciliation. Historical rivalry, ideological divergence, and competing leadership claims remain intact.

Pakistan’s Calculus
Pakistan occupies a distinctive position in this triangle. It brings three assets that neither Turkey nor Saudi Arabia possess in combination: a large professional military, deep defence ties with both partners, and a symbolic nuclear capability.

For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan represents a form of psychological nuclear reassurance. For Turkey, Pakistan is a reliable military interlocutor in the Islamic world. For Pakistan itself, participation in such discussions offers renewed relevance at a time of economic fragility.

There is also a quieter, less acknowledged dimension: assurance against conventional Indian power. While no Islamic bloc is likely to intervene militarily on Pakistan’s behalf, even symbolic mutuality of threat can serve as deterrence signalling. That said, the likelihood of Turkey or Saudi Arabia accepting obligations that could draw them into a conflict with India is extremely low. Their interests lie elsewhere, and neither seeks confrontation with New Delhi.

Capability Questions
Arguments that the absence of integrated command structures or joint doctrine invalidates the concept entirely are premature. Such mechanisms can, and often do, develop over time. NATO itself evolved over decades. However, capability development requires political trust and strategic convergence first. That is where the Islamic NATO idea falters. The divergence in leadership ambitions, threat perceptions, and geopolitical priorities makes deep integration unlikely, regardless of time. What could plausibly emerge instead are:

• Consultative security mechanisms
• Selective intelligence
• Joint exercises and defence industrial cooperation
• Coordinated messaging on regional security

These fall well short of collective defence.

More Semantic Than Real
I won’t classify this as the birth of an Islamic NATO. It is Turkey asserting leadership ambition, Saudi Arabia seeking psychological deterrence amid strategic uncertainty and Pakistan reclaiming relevance as a military interlocutor. It is not the birth of an Islamic NATO. It is more semantic than real—an exercise in strategic signalling rather than alliance formation.

For India, this distinction is critical. Pakistan’s outreach may generate noise, but it does not translate into durable power. India’s relationships across the Islamic world—built on credibility, economic depth, and strategic restraint—remain structurally stronger. The idea of an Islamic NATO reflects anxiety, ambition, and aspiration within parts of the Sunni world. It does not reflect readiness for alliance discipline.

Saudi Arabia’s strategic confidence is under strain; Turkey seeks leadership without abandoning NATO; Pakistan wants relevance without over-commitment. These impulses intersect, but they do not align.

India need not react. It should observe calmly, continue strengthening bilateral partnerships across West Asia, and preserve its reputation as a stable, reliable, and plural partner.

In geopolitics, alliances are mostly built on shared fears and shared futures. This arrangement offers neither.