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BL Chandak, former DGM at SIDBI, has worked for over three decades in research, project appraisal, credit sanctioning, policy liaison, and branch management.
May 6, 2026 at 5:44 AM IST
In the months leading to the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there was no visible panic in the financial markets. Credit markets appeared functional. Banks were lending. Growth projections held steady. Beneath that calm, however, a chain reaction had already begun—small, scattered defaults in subprime mortgages quietly travelling through an interconnected financial system. By the time policymakers recognised the pattern, the system had seized up.
India, today, is seeing a quieter build-up of stress. It lacks the drama, but not the consequences. It is not yet visible in financial markets, but it is increasingly evident across the country’s trade credit ecosystem.
Conditions that preceded the subprime crisis appear to be re-emerging in a structurally similar way. This time, the arena is not banks or capital markets, but the vast and largely unmonitored world of trade credit. This system is marked not only by rising delayed payments and unpaid invoices, but also by a decline in the flow and velocity of trade credit that sustains everyday business transactions. This combination of mounting arrears and slowing circulation is tightening liquidity at the base of the economy.
Same Mechanism
Trade credit is not peripheral. It is the backbone of working capital in the Indian economy. RBI data across several decades shows that sundry creditors consistently account for a larger share of sales at 16–17% than bank working capital at 8–14%. For MSMEs, trade credit funds a dominant share of working capital needs. Yet, unlike bank lending, this system operates largely outside formal regulatory monitoring. India tracks banks’ NPAs with precision, but the much larger universe of delayed/defaulted invoices, where stress accumulates, remains statistically invisible.
The system had adjusted to earlier disruptions such as demonetisation and GST. COVID did something different. It did not merely disrupt cash flows, but rewired behaviour. The distinction between inability and unwillingness to pay weakened. Firms with the capacity to pay began to delay payments. Enforcement softened, reputational consequences weakened, and once early defaulters faced little penalty, a signal spread across the system that delays and outright embezzlement carried very little cost.
This shift was broad-based. Delayed payments for micro enterprises surged from 46.2% of sales in 2019-20 to 65.7% in 2020-21—a sharp deterioration within a year. The median delay stretched to 195 days beyond the statutory 45-day limit, with nearly ₹10.7 trillion locked in receivables, signalling a deep and persistent liquidity strain across the system.
Behaviour Shift
Other economies responded to similar COVID-related stress by enhancing transparency. The United Kingdom mandated payment disclosures for large firms, Australia introduced standardized reporting frameworks, and China integrated enterprise payment data into its credit systems. The underlying idea was straightforward. When payment behaviour becomes visible, it can be disciplined. India, in contrast, has largely left the issue unaddressed because its credit frameworks are designed to track only banks and non-banking financial institutions. The much larger trade credit system remains outside the data framework.
At first glance, the macro picture looks steady. GST collections are healthy, digital payments are growing, and bank NPAs are contained. What these numbers miss is the tightening underneath. Liquidity increasingly exists on paper but not in practice. Firms are holding back payments in response to uncertainty around receivables, which tightens the flow of trade credit. Large, cash-rich firms are gaining share, while smaller but viable businesses are fading out with little visibility.
Any external shock, whether geopolitical, trade-related, or financial, could intensify these pressures. With oil prices volatile, supply chains uncertain, and payments already delayed, even a small trigger can widen the strain.
What is missing is integration. Unlike 2008, India is not lacking in infrastructure. GSTN captures business invoices, and digital payment systems record settlements. Linking these systems by matching invoices with payments can create a verifiable record of credit behaviour across firms.
Such a system would allow the creation of a payment behaviour score for businesses. Firms that pay on time would benefit from lower costs and stronger trust, while habitual delayers would face tighter credit conditions. Discipline would emerge through market incentives rather than regulatory intervention.
India’s MSME productivity gap is partly rooted in persistent working capital constraints. Addressing inefficiencies in trade credit can help narrow this gap and improve competitiveness.
The risk, therefore, is not of an immediate breakdown, but of a gradual distortion. In 2008, the underlying weakness was recognised only after a major failure. India has the advantage of recognising the signs earlier. A disruption in trade credit flows would not appear as a banking crisis, but as a steady weakening of economic activity.
Unpaid invoices are already placing pressure on the system. The absence of discipline in this informal credit network is cumulative in its effect. If left unaddressed, it will increasingly influence the trajectory of growth and the resilience of the broader financial system.