How AI and Real-Time Banking Are Turning Operational Risk Systemic Today

In a real-time, AI-driven financial system, operational risk is no longer peripheral. It is fast becoming a co-pillar of systemic stability.

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By Anupam Sonal

Anupam Sonal, a career central banker with 34+ years’ experience in regulation, supervision, customer protection and fintech, is currently a Senior Advisor and Independent Director to banks & NBFCs.

February 24, 2026 at 9:06 AM IST

Operational risk is no longer the quieter sibling of credit risk, relegated to footnotes in capital frameworks. In a digitised, AI-driven and hyper-connected financial system, it has become a structural determinant of stability. What was once defined narrowly under the Basel Capital Risk Standards as losses arising from failures of people, processes, systems or external events now possesses the capacity to amplify legal, reputational and even strategic risk with unprecedented velocity. 

This is not a cosmetic expansion of traditional categories. It reflects a deeper transformation in the way financial systems function, interact, and fail. The past two decades offered several low-frequency, high-severity operational shocks. Yet institutional learning remained episodic. Today’s transition is different in both architecture and intensity.

Supervisory signals from the Reserve Bank of India illustrate this change with unusual clarity. The regulatory emphasis on cyber-enabled frauds, money mule ecosystems, digital process abuse, third-party dependencies and AI-linked vulnerabilities is not a reaction to headline fraud statistics. It is an acknowledgement that risk generation in a real-time ecosystem has qualitatively changed. Initiatives such as MuleHunter.ai and the Digital Payments Intelligence Platform, alongside calibrated small-value digital fraud resolution mechanisms embody this recognition. They point towards a philosophy increasingly concerned with the embedded severity of operational events whose contagion can rival conventional credit shocks.

The technological backdrop for this evolution is uniquely Indian in both scale and velocity. Financial interactions are now instantaneous; onboarding is frictionless; design engines are increasingly algorithmic. Traditional buffers of time, distance, and procedural drag have dissolved.  Boardrooms today know they cannot opt out of AI. Yet regulatory guardrails and governance standards are still catching up. Innovation is racing ahead; oversight is running behind.

Architectural Shift
The discussions taking shape at India’s AI Impact Summit therefore intersect directly with prudential regulation. AI is not simply enhancing banking efficiency; it is reshaping the topology of financial vulnerability to modern operational risk landscape, characterised less by isolated control failures and more by intelligence-adaptive, networked, behaviourally camouflaged phenomena.

Operational risk can no longer be meaningfully understood through the lexicon of isolated process lapses or individual error. Institutional resilience now depends less on the existence of controls and more on the coherence with which signals are perceived, interpreted, and acted upon. The deeper vulnerability lies in the architecture of institutional sensing itself.

KYC frameworks, AML surveillance engines, fraud monitoring systems, cyber telemetry, and customer analytics are often technically robust but cognitively disjointed domains. Their outputs accumulate, but rarely converge into a unified risk narrative. Signals that should reinforce one another remain compartmentalised. Fragmentation persists not because systems fail, but because learning fails to propagate.

The remedy is not incremental integration but deliberate intelligence orchestration. Risk signals must interact dynamically. Entity resolution layers must reconcile customer, device, beneficiary and behavioural identities into unified profiles. An anomaly detected in one domain should recalibrate thresholds elsewhere in real time. Monitoring must evolve from parallel processing to interpretive synthesis.

Such a design philosophy also redefines governance itself. Escalation frameworks can no longer rely exclusively on alert severity within individual systems; they must recognise weak signals that converge over time. Feedback loops linking investigations, confirmed frauds, model adjustments, and control recalibration must operate with institutional discipline. The challenge is both architectural and epistemic: institutions must not simply detect signals, but understand them collectively.

This shift also fundamentally alters the temporal dimension of risk classification. Static KYC risk ratings, refreshed at intervals, cannot capture behaviour in a system defined by continuous transactions. Risk has to be treated as dynamic, not fixed, recalibrated as signals evolve. Customer due diligence must extend beyond identity checks. Prevention should focus less on isolated irregularities and more on disrupting emerging risk networks.

Analytical metrics must follow suit. Conventional dashboards centred on alert volumes, case closures, and recorded losses are insufficient. Greater prudential value lies in measuring false negative probability, loss avoidance, intervention velocity, and early detection of behavioural drift. Detection efficacy ceases to be a technical metric; it becomes a stability variable.

Viewed through this lens, supervisory thinking is gradually extending beyond traditional model validation towards a broader doctrine of detection governance and systemic defensibility. Institutions must demonstrate not only that models perform statistically, but that their detection ecosystems remain adaptive, interpretable, and resilient to behavioral and technological drift.

Customer protection mechanisms acquire systemic relevance within this framework. A one-time, small-value fraud resolution scheme may be perceived as consumer welfare intervention. It is in fact a stabilising device, preserving trust elasticity in a real-time payments network where confidence can erode faster than liquidity. Yet such measures remain palliative. They cannot substitute for structural prevention frameworks. 

The operational implications are neither incremental nor optional. Financial stability frameworks historically rested on credit, liquidity and market risk. In the new paradigm, operational risk has ascended as an equal co-pillar. Institutions that persist with fragmented architectures may witness rising false-negative exposures despite technological enhancement. Institutions that redesign around intelligence integration, behavioural continuity, detection efficacy, and AI-aware governance will define the next frontier of resilience.

Operational risk is no longer peripheral. It is systemic.