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Saibal Dasgupta is an author, veteran journalist, and noted China expert who has reported from Beijing since 2005 and contributes to global media and think-tanks.
May 9, 2026 at 3:00 PM IST
Serious questions about the future of the global financial order have resurfaced after the Chinese yuan climbed to its strongest level in three years on May 7, crossing 6.80 to the dollar. Some analysts now expect the currency to strengthen further toward 6.50 by early next year.
The move has revived debate around de-dollarisation and the growing role of the yuan in global trade and energy transactions. Yet the more important story may not be the decline of the dollar, which still dominates the global financial system, but the gradual emergence of parallel settlement ecosystems centred increasingly around China.
That shift carries important implications for countries like India.
The Indian rupee has already weakened sharply against the yuan, falling nearly 15% since 2024 to around ₹13.9 per yuan. A stronger Chinese currency raises the cost of imports from India’s largest trading partner at a time when imports from China reached roughly $131 billion in the year ended March 2026. For India, this is no longer merely a geopolitical or currency-market debate. It increasingly affects trade competitiveness, imported inflation and the broader external sector.
China has steadily expanded the use of yuan settlements for oil purchases from Russia and other suppliers, strengthening discussion around the idea of a “petroyuan.” The easing of sanctions on Russian oil and rising concerns in parts of West Asia about overdependence on the dollar-based system have accelerated these conversations.
The Iran conflict may ultimately be remembered less for its military consequences and more for exposing how geopolitical tensions can reshape global payments architecture. Even limited movement toward non-dollar settlement systems can alter reserve behaviour, trade invoicing, and currency demand over time.
Several other forces are also weighing on the dollar, such as the Federal Reserve’s independence and its monetary policy amidst the political pressure for interest rate cuts. The concerns over America’s mounting debt burden have also resurfaced.
Still, predictions of the dollar’s demise remain premature as the dollar continues to dominate roughly 88% of global currency transactions, supported by the unmatched depth of American financial markets, strong institutional credibility and the liquidity of US Treasury securities. No other currency currently offers the same combination of scale, convertibility, and investor confidence.
China’s ambitions face important constraints as well. Beijing has spent more than a decade trying to internationalise the yuan through swap arrangements and bilateral trade agreements with over 40 countries. Yet China still maintains extensive controls over capital flows, limiting the yuan’s attractiveness as a true reserve currency. Investors and central banks cannot move yuan assets with the same freedom or confidence as dollar-denominated holdings.
China wants the yuan to play a larger international role without fully relinquishing state control over its financial system.
Yet de-dollarisation does not require the dollar to collapse. The more realistic scenario may involve gradual fragmentation, where countries increasingly settle portions of trade in local currencies while building alternatives to Western financial infrastructure such as the Swift payments system.
China, Russia and Iran are expected to push for alternative payment arrangements at the next BRICS summit in New Delhi later this year. India, however, remains cautious. New Delhi has repeatedly signalled its broader commitment to the dollar-based system and appears wary of any architecture that could leave China exercising disproportionate influence.
That caution may prove well-founded as the dollar’s dominance may endure for decades. Nevertheless, there is little doubt the world’s payment system is slowly becoming less singular.